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Infrastructure and FDI Inflows into Mexico: A
Panel Data Approach∗
Andre Varella Mollick, Rene Ramos-Duran, and Esteban Silva-Ochoa

Abstract
In December 1993, restrictions to foreign ownership across major Mexican economic sectors
were abolished. This paper studies output, industrialization intensity, “international infrastructure”, and government expenditures on infrastructure as determinants of FDI inflows into Mexican
states over 1994-2001. We conduct a “general to specific” estimation strategy across Mexican
states. Telephone lines appear to be very important to FDI as their coefficients are around 2.0 in
Random Effects Models. Industrialization is also important, with coefficients varying from 0.62 to
0.67. Allowing for endogeneity between FDI and real output, dynamic GMM panels confirm the
robust effects of telephone lines on FDI. International infrastructure thus appears more conducive
to FDI than domestic infrastructure, such as interstate and secondary roads. With international
infrastructure being a major catalyst of FDI inflows into Mexico, we provide support to ongoing
conventional wisdom promoting such type of investment.
KEYWORDS: Agglomeration, FDI, Infrastructure, Mexico, Panel Data

∗

The very early stages of this research were funded by the research project on “The Economic
Agenda of the Mexican Border” held by the ITESM-Campus Monterrey in Mexico. Two anonymous referees of this journal provided helpful comments that helped improve the article. The
authors remain entirely responsible for any errors or shortcomings.

Brought to you by | University of Texas - Pan American
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/30/19 2:42 PM

Mollick et al.: FDI Inflows into Mexico

INTRODUCTION
Policy makers are often interested in knowing which forces attract foreign
capital into a country or region. Potential candidates include revenue (market size,
country’s fundamentals) and cost factors (access to foreign markets, regulation,
and wages) that affect the profitability of firms. In Mexico, in particular, some
states have benefited more than others after two almost simultaneous events: i) the
December 1993 foreign investment law that abolished restrictions to foreign
ownership in major sectors; and ii) the introduction of NAFTA in 1994.
Recognition of the infrastructure role is provided by government sponsored
agencies when discussing airport expansion programs and linking these to capital
inflows: “Queretaro and Puebla have benefited significantly from international
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) … By promoting modern and
innovative airport infrastructure, both states will enhance their ability to attract
foreign investment.” (Maquila Portal, 2002).
If this reasoning is correct, some questions remain unanswered. Among
them are: i) what kind of infrastructure contributes to attract FDI?; and ii) for a
given infrastructure level, is the relationship between agglomeration economies
(manufacturing activity as share of state GDP) and FDI positive as expected? This
article addresses these issues and studies Mexico’s recent experience of attracting
large sums of FDI: from US$ 5 billion in 1994 to over US$ 10 billion in 1995 and
to the unprecedented US$ 27 billion in 2001. Together with China, Mexico has
been used as a good attractor of FDI into emerging markets in theoretical work,
such as Aizenman (2003). Empirically, the recent survey on Mexico by Kose et
al. (2004) documents significant structural breaks in FDI levels in 1993, as well as
increases in investment by multinationals in response to NAFTA.
Agglomeration effects do, in fact, complement the microeconomic theory
of the firm and transaction costs. The framework by Dunning (1988) generally
lacks agglomeration forces and has been called OLI-theory due to: O of
ownership advantages and firm-specific assets, L of country-specific factors, and I
to the internalization of firm’s proprietary assets. Applying the OLI-theory to a
disaggregated panel of the U.K. food sector, Giulietti et al. (2004) find
predominant ownership-specific and industry characteristics with marginal
macroeconomic effects. Also using the OLI framework, Zhang (2001) concludes
that China’s huge market size, liberalized FDI regime, and improving
infrastructure are attractive to multinationals.
Several studies have adopted a regional perspective to FDI inflows. Based
on the uneven regional distribution of FDI in Turkey, Deichman et al. (2003) find
that agglomeration, depth of local financial markets, human capital, and coastal
access are helpful in attracting FDI. Buch et al. (2003) employ gravity equations
to European FDI and Tuan and Ng (2003) explore why Guangdong has been able
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to continuously attract and mobilize the largest share of FDI flows from Hong
Kong into China and especially into its Pearl River Delta region during the 1990s.
The process of manufacturing relocation from city core (Hong Kong) to its
peripheral locations (the Pearl River Delta) represents a case of spatial
development of a core-periphery system, as envisaged by Krugman (1991).
A study on Japanese acquisitions in the U.S. by Bloningen (1997)
combines the OLI-paradigm with exchange rate effects as elaborated by Froot and
Stein (1991). The quality of infrastructure, the degree of industrialization and the
level of inward FDI into the market are used by Wheeler and Mody (1992) as
agglomeration measures and are found to be major determinants of FDI in U.S.
manufacturing firms in the 1980s. Braunerhjelm and Svensson (1996) find
disaggregated agglomeration effects, particularly in technologically advanced
industries. On cross-country differences, Mody and Srinivasan (1998) contend
that U.S. firms are more influenced by domestic market conditions, in contrast to
Japanese firms. Head et al. (1995, p. 228) refer skeptically to “the near
impossibility of selecting and correctly measuring all of the relevant infrastructure
and input price information that affect location decisions. Omitted sources of
attractiveness would almost certainly induce a correlation between the error term
and the agglomeration variables.”
Having this literature as background, several features can be associated
with our study. First, we employ a unique data set on Mexican states, thus
capturing both time series (1994-2001) and cross-section (22 highest ranking
states by FDI amount) effects through panel data models. We do not know of any
other study that explores panel data methods on Mexican FDI since Love and
Lage Hidalgo (2000) apply the time series approach of Barrell and Pain (1996),
while Feenstra and Hanson (1997) and Khawar (2003) study FDI effects into
relative wages and productivity in Mexico, respectively. Second, the Mexican
territory is divided into six regions that share geographic features, such as the
Northern border states and the top 10 state destination of FDI inflows.1 Third, we
formulate the benchmark specification with four independent variables and
employ a “general to specific” approach in order to assess the adequacy of the
benchmark model. We believe that the residual-based approach mitigates a lot of
the uncertainty regarding the “true model specification”. We also take into
account endogeneity problems between FDI and real output and employ dynamic
generalized method of moments (GMM) panels. Fourth, the relationship between
agglomeration economies and infrastructure is an important part of this study. In
contrast to Cheng and Kwan (2000), Campos and Kinoshita (2003) and Deichman
1

Several papers put forward a regional approach to FDI but explore reverse causation
mechanisms: FDI affecting GDP growth in Sun and Chai (1998) or FDI affecting state exports in
Leichenko and Erickson (1997) and Sun (2001). An exception is Sun et al. (2002) who study
regional determinants of FDI in China, although they do not handle industrialization intensity.
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et al. (2003) who appeal to lagged FDI as agglomeration forces, we introduce
explicitly industrialization intensity.
This study attempts to fill the gap of no systematic study on the
relationship between FDI and infrastructure for a developing economy. We
conduct estimations at Mexican states over 1994-2001, following a “general to
specific” strategy. The concentration of telephone lines appear to be very
important to FDI as their coefficients range from 1.98 (all states) to 2.02 (all states
but DF) in panel Random Effects Models (REM) estimations. Agglomeration is
also important, with coefficients varying from 0.62 to 0.67. The article discusses
the robustness of these findings along several dimensions, including endogeneity
between FDI and real GDP. Under dynamic GMM panels, the effect of telephone
lines on FDI increases slightly to around 3.0, contrasting to other explanatory
variables whose coefficients do not become statistically significant.
This paper contains five more sections. The next provides an overview of
FDI inflows into Mexico and the following one introduces the econometric
methodology. Subsequent sections list the variables in this study and present the
major results. The last offers conclusions and presents extensions for future work.
THE PATTERN OF FDI INFLOWS INTO MEXICO
FDI inflows into Mexico have experienced a significant upheaval since the
commercial openness of the country in the mid 1980s. Original data for this paper
are taken from INEGI’s annual Census of States, available in hard copies and not
electronically. The introduction of a law on foreign ownership restrictions in late
1993 and NAFTA implementation in 1994 suggest the choice of 1994 as the
starting date. On the end date of the sample, INEGI’s Census of States
publications occur with substantial time lags. We thus gathered data from 1994 to
2001, since data for 2002 were not complete at the time of data construction in
2004.
As shown in Figure 1, from 1980 to 1985, Mexico received 1,298 million
U.S. dollars (USD) in yearly averages, which incremented almost 200% during
1986 – 1993, following Mexico’s entrance into GATT. The total FDI amount
climbed to an average of USD 3,468 million in the 1986 – 1993 period. The FDI
boom into the country, however, actually started with the NAFTA signature in
1994, when Mexico received USD 10,657 million of FDI. Almost simultaneously,
in December 1993 a Foreign Investment Law abolished restrictions to foreign
ownership in major Mexican economic sectors. Under the law, foreign investment
is permitted in any sector, unless specifically mentioned as subject to restrictions
(Mexico, 2000). Due to the overall economic uncertainty that followed the
currency crisis of 1995, the 1994 FDI amount could not be maintained in the
following two years. After declining in 1995 and 1996, the trend reverts again and
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becomes positive during the post NAFTA period climbing to the yearly average
of USD 12,912 million.
In addition to this growing trend at the aggregate, the distribution of FDI
inflows into Mexico is heavily concentrated across geographical locations. Table
1 offers a general overview of the 1994-2001 period and explains which states are
omitted from the analysis due to data construction problems. Just the Distrito
Federal (Mexico, DF, the capital) received an average of 60% of the total FDI
amount directed to Mexico during the period between 1994 and 2001. If we
consider the Estado de Mexico (the political entity that includes the metropolitan
zone of Mexico City) as well, this participation rises to 64%.2 Next to the
metropolitan zone of Mexico City, the Border Region of Mexico attracts most
FDI across the country, with the six Northern Border states receiving about one
fourth of the national total. The remaining states receive just 10%, on average, of
total FDI inflows.
As figure 2 shows, the relative importance of Mexico City’s Metropolitan
Zone declined considerably in the six years period after NAFTA (1994 – 2000).
The trend reversed in 2001, in which the unprecedented FDI inflows can be
explained by the acquisition of the biggest financial institution of the country
(BANAMEX) by U.S. Citicorp.3
HYPOTHESIS TESTING AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGIES
The basic theoretical mechanism of determining FDI factors across
Mexican states includes effects on revenues and on costs of investors, as put
forward by Carlton (1983) and Coughlin et al. (1991). The restricted profit
function ij of firm i in state j can therefore be written as:
it

= K0 X1j

1

… Xmj

m

(exp Oit)N

(1),

where: Xsj = exogenous variables (s = 1,…, m) at state j, K0, N, 1, … , m are
unknown constants, and Oit is the firm-location specific effect, which is assumed
to be independently distributed across i and j and follow the Weibull distribution.
The unknown N is the number such that the 1/N th root of the specific effect

2

The accounting method for FDI inflows into Mexico, DF, could overestimate the amount of
funds towards the capital, as flows to Mexico City’s metropolitan zone are taken to be flows into
the DF. This is a consequence of many national and international firms establishing their
headquarters in Mexico, DF.
3
In May of 2001, Citigroup purchased the Banco Nacional de Mexico (BANAMEX) for USD
12,500 million. This figure represented 47% of total FDI received by the country in 2001 and
about 62% of the total received by the Distrito Federal.
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follows a Weibull distribution. Taking logarithms of (1) and dividing by N, we
obtain:
ln

it

/ N = K1 +

k

ln Xkj + Oit

(2),

k
where: K1 = ln K0 /N is a constant and k R k/N. Firm i locates in state j*
provided profits are highest in state j* ( ij* = maxj ij). The (RHS) of (2) for state
j* must exceed that for other states. Panel data regression models will provide
elasticities, as our specifications are defined in logarithms aggregated at the state
level:
FDIjt = Tj + UXjt + Ojt

(3),

where j = 1, …, 22 states; FDIjt are the (logarithm) FDI flows into the j-th state,
the vector Xjt denotes the FDI various potential determinants (in logarithms) listed
below, and Ojt are serially uncorrelated errors with zero mean and constant
variance. We form six regional groups of j states as follows: all 22 states, all
states but DF (21 states), the six U.S.-Mexico border states, top 10 ranked states
(“rank”) in terms of FDI inflows regardless of geographic region, non-border
states (16 states), and non-border states but DF (15 states). We focus on the first
four groups, omitting the two groups of non-border states.
Applying the Fixed Effects Model (FEM) to (3) assumes the effects of
omitted country-specific variables are fixed and correlate with the regressors.
Suppose agglomeration variables compose the vector X and INF is not explicitly
introduced into X. It then follows that infrastructure effects are probably present
in the fixed effects if they do not vary widely over time.4 If, however,
infrastructure varies over time, then they should appear in the vector X and the
fixed effects capture something else. The Random Effects Model (REM) treats the
country-specific effects as random variables, which are independent of the
regressors. If T (time units) is sufficiently large compared to N (cross section
units), the two methods yield similar results. Since the nature of country specific

4

Mody and Srinivasan (1998) mention that any attempt to use the between (cross sectional)
variation implies the possibility of bias because of the correlation between Ojt and Xjt. If Ojt = µj +
vjt, it is possible that the µj term represents an important omitted variable correlated with some
elements of the X. The bias then occurs because the influence of this unobserved state effect on
FDI may be wrongly attributed to state attributes. Mody and Srinivasan (1998, p. 785) point out
infrastructure as an obvious candidate for the bias, since it changes slowly from one year to
another: “If the unobserved µj reflects general business and operating conditions in the country, it
is likely that µj and infrastructure will be correlated.”
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effects is unknown in FDI analysis, we estimate both models and compare the
results using statistic-based criteria, such as the Hausman test.
Across all specifications, we use White’s matrix of heteroskedasticity
consistent covariance, which makes the variance estimator robust to
heteroskedasticity. This does not mean, however, that the estimations are free of
contemporaneous correlation across cross-sections. In order to check this, we
conduct two sorts of serial correlation tests, both derived from the Lagrange
Multiplier (LM) Breusch-Godfrey test. For each panel equation we regress the
computed residuals on RHS variables and on (lagged one period) residuals. In the
annual data context, any serial correlation is likely to appear with only one lagged
residual term. The tables below report both the LM t-statistics on the lagged
residual term and the LM NR2 statistic, which has a 2(p) distribution, where p is
the number of parameters in the auxiliary regression.
An extension of (3) is to consider a lagged dependent variable model:
FDIjt = Tj + UXjt +

kFDIjt-k

+ Ojt

(4),

upon which first-differencing eliminates the individual effect and produces:
FDIjt = U Xjt +

k

FDIjt-k + Ojt

(5),

which can be estimated by GMM as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and
Blundell and Bond (1998). Efficient GMM techniques employ different types of
instruments as discussed, e.g., in the survey by Bond (2002).
THE VARIABLES
We proceed to the construction of independent variables appearing in the
vector X: local GDP (Y), industrialization intensity (AGG), “international
infrastructure” measured by telephone lines (INF), and government expenditures
on infrastructure (GOV). The rationale for choosing these specific variables in the
vector X is three-fold. First, INF lies on the foundation of our hypothesis that
infrastructure should lead to higher FDI; second, variables other than INF must be
present in vector X, upon which expected signs can be assigned; and third, data
availability. All real variables are deflated by the Banco de Mexico’s 1994 base
year Consumer Price Index. The list of variables is as follows:
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): The dependent variable contains the
yearly U.S. dollar amount of foreign investment that each Mexican state receives.
Dividing it by population or by state GDP does not change qualitatively the nature
of the results.

DOI: 10.2202/1524-5861.1094
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Market Size (Y): Approximated by the per capita GDP, this variable is
constructed by taking the GDP of each state, deflating it by the Banco de
Mexico’s CPI with base year 1994 and dividing it by each year’s state annual
population. The annual population is estimated as follows: we take the data given
by INEGI in the 1990 demographic census and multiply each year by the INEGI’s
state average population growth rate of that decade. We expect the larger Y is, the
more a state receives of foreign investment due to a larger local demand for the
firm’s products. This variable, affecting the revenue side of firms, is perhaps the
most common in FDI studies, including Coughlin et al. (1991), Braunerhjelm and
Svensson (1996), Love and Lage-Hidalgo (2000), Zhang (2001), Deichman et al.
(2003), Filippaios et al. (2003), Tuan and Ng (2003), among others.
Infrastructure (INF): The amount of residential and non-residential
telephone connections per each thousand state inhabitants. The very same variable
has been employed by Bougheas et al. (2000) and Li and Liu (2005) to several
countries and by Asiedu (2002) to African economies. The relationship between
INF and FDI must be positive, as more firms feel attracted to the state’s physical
capacity, presumably due to lower operating costs. Three other measures were
used: INF1 as the total length of the state’s interstate road network (kilometers);
INF2 as the total length of the state’s paved secondary roads (kilometers); and
INF3 as the total square kilometers of the state’s paved routes: INF1 + INF2.
Theoretical work in Martin and Rogers (1995) distinguish between domestic and
international infrastructure. General public administration and transport
infrastructure that facilitates domestic trade can be classified as domestic
infrastructure, while the building of harbors, international airports or the
improvement of international communications system are interpreted as
international infrastructure. If only INF appears to be robust in the estimations, it
may indicate that international infrastructure is operative in Mexico. Casual
inspection confirms that the Mexican capital and northern border states have
larger figures. The INF figures are highest in the DF at 29.11, in Nuevo León at
18.86, and in Baja California at 16.27.
Agglomeration Economies (AGG): Constructed as the share of
manufacturing output in a state’s GDP. This variable may affect profits in various
ways. Coughlin et al. (1991) refer to states with higher densities of manufacturing
activity attracting more FDI because foreign investors might be serving existing
manufacturers. Firms could also become more efficient due to economies of
agglomeration located in the state, since clusters of manufacturing units would
attract more firms that wish to profit from such positive external economic
effects. The relationship between AGG and FDI must be positive. The AGG
figures are highest in Coahuila at 0.35, State of Mexico at 0.33, and Querétaro at
0.32, known for highly concentrated manufacturing clusters.
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Government Expenditures on Infrastructure (GOV): The share of the
annual state’s government expenditures on infrastructure and investment
promotion out of its total annual expenditures. We expect that the more a
government spends on its state’s physical capacity, the more firms feel attracted
by these incentives. The relationship should be positive, although of course too
large GOV should dismantle the market mechanism and diminish the
attractiveness of establishing business in a certain place. Previous studies
handling this variable include Deichman et al. (2003), who utilized public
investment expenditure as share of provincial GDP.
Real Wages (RW): Two different sorts of real wages are used. First, a
weighted tradable and non-tradable sector wage average is taken. The tradable
component is the maquiladora industry’s real annual average wage in pesos and
the non-tradable component is the construction industry’s real annual average
wage. The tradable weight is estimated as the sum of Manufacturing plus
Agricultural and Service Sectors State GDP divided by its total GDP. The nontradable weight takes into account the rest of the sectors. Second, we simply use
the maquiladora’s per state annual real average wage in pesos. Over the years, the
latter was found to be a parallel shift of the former, and the results are not
sensitive to the change in these definitions. While capturing the cost side of profit
functions, there is ambiguity in the interpretation of the sign of wages in the FDI
literature. This is so because it may represent skill upgrading and therefore might
imply a positive correlation between RW and FDI. Because the coefficients were
never statistically significant, we remove RW from the benchmark model and
keep it as instrumental variable.5
Labor Union (LU): This is the ratio of the collective contract demanders
over the state’s total amount of firms. We expect LU to have a negative
relationship with our dependent variable, as more collective demands suggest
higher costs. While Beeson and Husted (1989) found that higher levels of
5

With only two independent variables (Y together with RW), RW have either positive (close to
one) or statistically insignificant effects on FDI flows. These results on real wages are not unheard
of in the literature. Zhang (2001), for example, finds a –0.027 and statistically insignificant value
for a panel of Chinese states, a result also shared by Giulietti et al. (2004) for a panel of UK food
sectors. Sun et al. (2002) find for the early subsample wage coefficients of 6.06 with t-value of
2.74 under OLS and 4.66 with a t-value of 6.72 under GLS. They justify the contrary to expected
findings in this manner: “Recall that during this early period, most of the FDI originates from
Hong Kong… Since the Hong Kong manufacturing industry was export-oriented, goods produced
by these Chinese factories were export out eventually. Quality control for these export products
was essential. In this period, factory managers with skilled workers were sent to China to train up
the local workers. Needless to say, it was quite costly and hence Chinese skilled workers were in
big demand.” Sun et al. (2002, p. 100). Filippaios et al. (2003, p. 1784) explore U.S. FDI into
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Korea for 1982-1997 and justify the positive results of wages
on FDI similarly: “A possible explanation could be that higher wages is an indicator of a more
specialized labour force.”
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unionization are associated positively with productive efficiency in manufacturing
across states, Coughlin et al. (1991) maintains that unionization is expected to
deter FDI but do find surprisingly positive effects in his state-level econometric
level across the 50 U.S. states. For the U.K. food sector, Giulietti et al. (2004) find
that changes in trade union membership have attracted FDI, but only at the 10%
level. Though in all panels the expected negative effect of LU on FDI is observed,
LU has significance only for the non-border groups. Preliminary estimates
suggest LU affects FDI negatively only in states not close to the United States.
Exploring in detail this point is an interesting research topic by itself but clearly
lies beyond the scope of this paper. Similar to wages, we leave LU to be used as
instrumental variable.
THE RESULTS
Analysis of the Benchmark Model
Table 2 contains the REM estimations of the benchmark model with Y,
INF, AGG and GOV variables. The maintained hypothesis is exogeneity of these
four RHS variables, which will be relaxed later. Hausman tests at the bottom of
the table confirm that the REM is well specified since the null hypothesis is never
rejected at standard confidence levels.6 The measure of international infrastructure
INF has positive and more than proportional impacts on the FDI flows, although
this is weakened for the panel of states of the border. The market size variable is
not statistically significant, however. The AGG coefficient is statistically
significant with robust values of 0.67 (“all states”) or 0.72 (“all states but DF”).
The government size variable has a negative, yet statistically insignificant
coefficient, in most cases. The null of no serial correlation is rejected only for the
rank panels: -2.48 by the t-statistics for the model with GOV and -2.63 for the
model without GOV. With three explanatory variables (output, infrastructure, and
agglomeration), similar results on the coefficients are observed.
Following the suggestion by Bekaert and Harvey (1997), we report the
Adjusted R2 statistics of the common intercept model, which is plagued by serial
correlation problems. In such model, the constant is the same for all states. For the
“all states” panel, for instance, moving from the random effects to the common
6

Following Betts et al. (2001), we also adopt a compromise strategy between FEM and REM. We
estimate REM that control for FDI levels in the U.S. (FDIUS), the neighboring country for
Mexico and responsible for a large part of its FDI inflows. The correlation between FDI into
Mexico (summing all 22 states) and FDI into the U.S. is quite high. Despite being highly
correlated, other regressors than FDIUS appear to capture most of the variation (at least 80%) of
FDI into Mexican states. The results of these models are available upon request.
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intercept model reduces the Adjusted R2 statistics from 0.848 to 0.665: a 0.183
reduction. For the “all states but DF” panel, a 0.233 reduction is achieved, while
for the “border states” panel there is a 0.288 reduction. State-specific intercepts
therefore explain in general about 18% of the variation of flows into the 22
Mexican states covered in the data.
How well do the results of the benchmark model in Table 2 fare in view of
the literature? Given the construction of AGG variables, it is recommended we
focus on Zhang (2001) and Coughlin et al. (1991). Zhang (2001) verifies AGG as
industrialization intensity and obtains a 0.87 coefficient for China, statistically
significant at 10%, together with a 0.21 coefficient for the transportation network.
Coughlin et al. (1991) also employ manufacturing density and obtain coefficients
between 0.355 and 0.473 on the probability of selecting a specific U.S. state for
FDI with infrastructure and incentives as explanatory variables.
The coefficient on INF (an index of infrastructure quality) is found to be
1.57 and on AGG is 1.40, both statistically significant in the translog specification
on investment by Wheeler and Mody (1992). When lagged FDI captures
agglomeration effects, INF (output of electricity per dollar GDP) is found to be
below one in general and between 0.67 and 0.74 in the REMs by Mody and
Srinivasan (1998). These figures look in agreement with Head et al. (1995):
increases in the number of establishments in some industry by 10% would
increase its likelihood of being chosen by a subsequent investor in that industry
by 5-6%.7 OLS cross-sections in Asiedu (2002) on developing countries yield
coefficients of telephone lines on FDI that range from 0.57 to 0.84, increasing to
1.35 in case of panel data estimation under interactive African country dummy
variables.
With only two explanatory variables (output and infrastructure), Table 3
shows that the values of the coefficients associated with real output are higher
when infrastructure is measured by roads (INF1) than by phones (INF). The
standard errors on the former, however, are very large, yielding lack of statistic
significance for the coefficient on INF1. This suggests that infrastructure has an
effect on the volume of FDI only if international infrastructure (telephone lines) is
considered. This finding has been reported by Bougheas et al. (2000) for crosscountry studies. Our findings suggest the concentration of telephone lines affects
FDI positively at about 2 for the largest panel.
Contrary to the benchmark model, however, the output coefficient is
statistically significant for the panel of all states at 1.636. This suggests
misspecification when both Y and INF are included in the vector X. We will
7

A different procedure is adopted by Sun et al. (2002) who calculate the relative accumulation of
FDI to domestic investment and find a negative and statistically coefficient of -0.37 on Chinese
FDI. They interpret this as existing FDI not attracting further inflows of FDI fast enough, thus
bringing a limit to agglomeration (a threshold level).
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return to this point soon. Not reported in Tables 2 and 3 are the estimations of
smaller scale models. Results for models with only real state output (Y) as the
explanatory variable yield state output coefficients varying from 3.29 for the
“rank” group in REM to 5.40 for the same group in FEM. With AGG as the
single-variable model, the elasticities of the coefficients in the REM model are
reduced. Serial correlation implies badly specified regressions when both Y and
AGG are sole explanatory variables.
Model Specification Issues: Residuals
What can be said about the model specification of FDI determinants?
Does the move from larger scale vectors to a small-scale vector X of independent
variables lead to improvements in the overall fit of the different models?
Apparently not, since the estimated effects of regressors on Mexican state FDI
become incredibly large in the smaller type models. One strategy is to inspect the
residuals of each model since they represent deviations from the predicted FDI
values to observed FDI figures. We do not find substantial outliers in the
residuals, which in general are well below the critical 1.65 level to be classified as
outlier. Apart from occasional values for the Guerrero and Guanajuato states in
some specifications, only the residual of the San Luis Potosi state was
systematically negative in 1998, suggesting that FDI into that state was lower than
predicted by the model for that year.
Table 4 reports the (averaged over time) residuals generated by the REM
for the “all states” panel. We calculate the standard deviation of time series
residuals for each state to identify whether FDI that can be explained by the
model. The standard deviations of residuals are the entries shown in the upper part
of Table 4. The bold-faced cells represent the highest (or “worst”) residuals across
each cross-section unit. The sum of these bold-faced figures across states is
reported in the line “Sum of Highest Residuals across All States”. The procedure
is repeated and summaries appear in the bottom part of Table 4.
It follows from Table 4 that the variability of the residuals is substantially
larger under the simplest model with AGG only. For the “all states” panel,
averaged residuals over time are more volatile for the AGG model for 13 of the
states and for 5 of the states for the largest model (FDI, Y, INF, AGG, GOV). The
specification with just AGG in vector X is consistent with infrastructure not
changing much over time. According to Table 4, this specification turns out to be
the worst of all. The highest residuals for the model with AGG only are also
observed redefining panels. For the 21 states panel (removing Mexico City: DF),

11

Brought to you by | University of Texas - Pan American
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/30/19 2:42 PM

Global Economy Journal, Vol. 6 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 6

12 states present highest residuals in the simplest model with only AGG only and
3 states do so for the largest model.8
Overall, the analysis of residuals across the five models suggests that
either the largest X vector (the benchmark) or the model with (Y, INF) as
explanatory variables are the preferred ones. In any case, INF turns out to appear
as a legitimate (RHS) variable rather than appearing as the constant term of panel
data estimations. This is consistent with plenty of variation in infrastructure from
year to year, which certainly has been the case in Mexico after abolishment of
restrictions on foreign capital and NAFTA from 1994 onwards. See also footnote
4 on this methodological note.
Model Specification Issues: Endogeneity
Also critical is the bidirectional effect of output on FDI and of FDI on
output. In order to address this point, we check first the sample correlation matrix.
We see very high correlation coefficients between INF and Y (0.93), followed by
INF and FDI (0.70) and by FDI and Y (0.63). All other correlation coefficients
are smaller than 0.40. When infrastructure is measured by roads (in kilometers),
the correlation coefficients between INF1 and Y is -0.184 and between INF1 and
FDI is -0.33.
To examine whether there exist endogenous relationships between FDI,
output and infrastructure we perform augmented Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH)
tests as done recently by Li and Liu (2005). Let, for example, FDI be expressed as
function of Y and INF while Y is written as function of FDI and AGG. We can
estimate FDI as function of Y, INF and AGG and generate the residuals, which
are then included in an equation of Y estimated on FDI, AGG. If the included
residuals are statistically significant, there is endogeneity between FDI and Y. We
obtain by the DWH a coefficient of -0.173 (standard error of 0.009), which
represents a t-statistic of -19.475. Applying the same procedure for FDI as
function of Y, INF, AGG and GOV and Y as function of FDI and RW, the DWH
yields a t-statistic of -6.713. It is fair to assume therefore an endogenous
relationship between FDI and Y.
Applying the same DWH procedure, we do not find endogeneity between
FDI and INF. If we assume FDI can be expressed as function of Y and INF, with
INF modeled as function of FDI and Y, the coefficient associated with the
residuals is 0.009 (standard error of 0.057): a t-statistic of only 0.154. Yet there

8

Table 4 also reports the result of residual checking when classified by lowest values of volatility.
For example, for 8 states the residuals have lowest standard deviation in the more general model
with (FDI, Y, INF, AGG, GOV) for the “all states” panel; and 7 states do so for the “all but DF”
panel. The larger dimension model is thus preferred.
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appears that collineality plagues the relationship when Y and INF appear together
in X given their high sample correlation.
Under the assumption of an endogenous relationship between FDI and Y,
one can estimate a dynamic panel data by the generalized method of moments
(GMM) as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond
(1998). Critical in any instrumental variable (IV) procedure such as the GMM is
the selection of appropriate instruments. We use RHS variables as instruments
and estimate by panel GMM equation (3) above and versions of equations (4) and
(5). Efficient GMM techniques employ different instruments as discussed by
Bond (2002).
Table 5 contains estimations in levels and first-differences of FDI as
function of explanatory variables. Infrastructure captured as international phones
has a strong and statistically significant effect on FDI, with the estimates varying
from 2.717 to 3.354. These results are not sensitive to instrumenting by either lags
of other X’s variables such as RW and LU or by lags of AGG and INF. Column
(3) with the specification (INF, AGG, GOV) suffers from serial correlation
problems. With detailed serial correlation tests omitted for space constraints, the
results of Table 5 reinforce the explanatory role of INF in the REM models of
Table 2. The set of results under dynamic GMM suggests that INF is the only
statistically significant explanatory variable in FDI equations.
The right panel of Table 5 contains estimations in first-differences.
Estimations under other instrumental variables were performed and did not
change the qualitative conclusions. Increases in infrastructure have a positive
effect on changes in FDI with a more than proportional effect. The fit of the firstdifferenced equations, however, are not adequate as evidenced by serial
correlation problems and negative Adjusted R2 statistics.9 Despite these, the
dynamic GMM estimates confirm the previous findings on INF by taking into
account explicitly the ongoing endogeneity between FDI and output.

9

One explanation for this finding is that parameters may not be identified using first-differenced
GMM when the series are random walks as noted by Bond (2002). Another possibility is that we
do not have sufficient observations in the time dimension to handle estimations in differenced
form. Equations with lagged FDI as regressors suggested considerable persistence in the series as
noticed by the close to one coefficients associated with the lagged FDI regressor.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Despite Mexico’s resolute opening to foreign capital from 1994 onwards,
there has been no systematic study on the relationship between FDI and
infrastructure. We conduct estimations at Mexican states over 1994-2001,
following a “general to specific” strategy. The concentration of telephone lines
appear to be very important to FDI as their coefficients are about 2.0 in panel
REM estimations. Agglomeration is also important, with coefficients varying
from 0.62 to 0.67. The article discusses the robustness of these findings along
several dimensions, including endogeneity between FDI and real GDP and
collineality problems between INF and Y. Under dynamic GMM panels, the
effect of telephone lines on FDI increases to around 3.0.
Two main conclusions are offered. First, international infrastructure
(telephone lines) appears to be more relevant to Mexican FDI than domestic
infrastructure (interstate roads). While Martin and Rogers (1995) provide
theoretical discussion on this matter, no empirical evidence seems to exist for
FDI. Second, this study argues that treating infrastructure as a constant leads to
specification problems. Our findings support ongoing conventional wisdom in
Mexico that investment in infrastructure attracts FDI.
Due to data constraints, this paper studies aggregate FDI flows into
Mexico. Recent studies by Calderón et al. (2004) have emphasized that
acquisition of existing assets (M&A) grew much more rapidly than “greenfield”
FDI. Distinguishing between the two types of FDI could provide further insights
into the role of agglomeration and infrastructure in the process of attracting FDI.
Recent works, such as Albuquerque (2003), suggest that FDI should be relatively
higher for countries with greater financing constraints. These are two possible
research routes for the future.
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Figure 1
FDI into Mexico (Millions of U.S. Dollars)
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Figure 2
Share of FDI by region
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Table 1
Flows of FDI into Mexican States in Millions of U.S. Dollars, 1994-2001.
1994 -1997

1998 -2001

Average per Year

State

Flows

Share

Flows

Share

Flows

Share

National total

38872.5

100.0%

64425.6

100.0%

12912.3

100.0%

Mexico City

25251.9

65.0%

40738.2

63.2%

8248.8

63.9%

Distrito Federal

23612.9

60.7%

37449.3

58.1%

7632.8

59.1%

Edo. De México

1639.0

4.2%

3288.9

5.1%

616.0

4.8%

U.S. Border States

10469.6

26.9%

15911.7

24.7%

3297.7

25.5%

Nuevo León

4336.5

11.2%

5919.7

9.2%

1282.0

9.9%

Baja California

1870.5

4.8%

2845.4

4.4%

691.2

5.4%

Chihuahua

1875.1

4.8%

2242.7

3.5%

607.5

4.7%

Tamaulipas

1374.1

3.5%

1295.7

2.0%

375.7

2.9%

Sonora

529.2

1.4%

776.5

1.2%

185.2

1.4%

Coahuila

484.2

1.2%

603.7

0.9%

156.1

1.2%

Non-U.S. Border States

3151

8.1%

7775.7

12.1%

1365.8

10.6%

Jalisco

566.2

1.5%

2012.4

3.1%

377.8

2.9%

Puebla

473.5

1.2%

787.4

1.2%

218.7

1.7%

Querétaro

324.4

0.8%

419.9

0.7%

115.2

0.9%

San Luis Potosí

175.6

0.5%

507.1

0.8%

111.2

0.9%

Guanajuato

84.5

0.2%

215.5

0.3%

64.6

0.5%

Baja California Sur

105.3

0.3%

223

0.3%

58.1

0.4%

Morelos

165.6

0.4%

251.9

0.4%

54.5

0.4%

Aguascalientes

108.5

0.3%

207.6

0.3%

50.8

0.4%

Yucatán

129.7

0.3%

127.2

0.2%

49.4

0.4%

Sinaloa

204.7

0.5%

66.7

0.1%

41.4

0.3%

Guerrero

64.3

0.2%

48.9

0.1%

16.7

0.1%

Durango

67.3

0.2%

40.6

0.1%

14.7

0.1%

Tlaxcala

41.7

0.1%

57.8

0.1%

14.1

0.1%

Zacatecas

50.7

0.1%

36.9

0.1%

11.6

0.1%

Other states
589.0
1.5%
2772.8
4.3%
166.9
1.3%
Sources and Notes: Calculations are based on the Banco de Información Económica of Mexico’s INEGI.
FDI flows for the two periods consider the cumulative amounts of millions of U.S. dollars converted into
constant prices. Omitted states are: Campeche, Colima, Chiapas, Hidalgo, Nayarit, Michoacán, Oaxaca,
Quintana Roo and Veracruz, which are not included because of data deficiencies. In addition to the
regional groups, the empirical analysis includes a group defined as “Rank”. It contains the 10 states with
the highest average amount of FDI over the sample (1994-2001). This group is composed of the six border
states plus the DF, Estado de Mexico, Jalisco and Puebla. Altogether, these 10 states account for about
95% of the total FDI received during the period of analysis.
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Table 2
Panel Estimates of FDI Location Determinants
FDI = F1 (Y, INF, AGG, GOV) and FDI = F3 (Y, INF, AGG)
Pooled OLS and FGLS Estimations: Random Effects
1995 – 2001
Panels

All
States

All
States
but D.F.

Border
States

Rank

All
States

All
States
but D.F.

Border
States

Rank

Y
Std. Error

1.456*
(0.783)

1.199
(0.855)

1.711
(1.408)

0.276
(0.948)

1.351*
(0.771)

1.131
(0.845)

1.838
(1.293)

0.146
(0.910)

INF
Std. Error

1.856***
(0.586)

1.801***
(0.600)

1.292*
(0.752)

2.582***
(0.728)

2.020***
(0.556)

1.979***
(0.573)

1.278*
(0.710)

2.723***
(0.678)

AGG
Std. Error

0.666**
(0.310)

0.720**
(0.320)

0.051
(1.375)

0.918
(0.931)

0.621**
(0.303)

0.668**
(0.308)

-0.375
(1.123)

1.022
(0.877)

GOV
Std. Error

-0.135
(0.156)

-0.154
(0.163)

0.068
(0.157)

-0.087
(0.154)

Adj. R2

0.848

0.802

0.853

0.844

0.848

0.801

0.851

0.845

DW

1.656

1.666

2.875

2.181

1.638

1.637

2.787

2.162

Adj. R2
Com.
N
N*T
LM t-st.
LM NR2
Hausman
Test

0.665

0.569

0.565

0.639

0.665

0.572

0.573

0.639

22
153
0.22
8.19
3.448
[0.486]

21
146
0.24
7.44
3.458
[0.484]

6
42
N.A.
N.A.
0.000
[1.000]

10
70
-2.48**
5.40
0.000
[1.000]

22
153
0.36
9.75**
1.507
[0.68]

21
146
0.40
8.68
2.223
[0.53]

6
42
-1.57
1.26
0.000
[1.000]

10
70
-2.63**
7.38
1.513
[0.68]

Notes: Data are of annual frequency from 1994 to 2001 per state; the 1994 observation is not available for
infrastructure, which makes the model run from 1995 to 2001. All estimates are performed by the Feasible
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) method for the Random Effects Model. No weighting is assumed on the
residual covariance matrix. The random effects model includes constant terms ( 0) that differ across states.
All these constant terms are omitted for space constraints. The “Adj. R2 Com” refers to the Adj. R2 of the
common intercept model suggested by Bekaert and Harvey (1997) as a test of how much of the variation in
FDI is explained by the specified variables. The LM t-stat. is the t-statistic associated with the lagged residual
within a standard Lagrange Multiplier test on the residuals of the panel data regression. The LM NR2 stat. is
the value derived from N and R2 computed in this auxiliary regression. This statistic follows a chi-squared
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of estimated parameters (p) in the auxiliary
2
2
regression:
(5) = 11.07 for fixed effects and
(6) = 12.59 for random effects. The LM NR2 stat. is
calculated under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation up to lag order 1. The asterisks *, **, and ***
indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3
Panel Estimates of FDI Location Determinants
FDI = F4 (Y, INF) and FDI = F4 (Y, INF1)
Pooled OLS and FGLS Estimations: Random Effects
1995 – 2001
Panels

All
States

All
States
but D.F.

Border
States

Rank

All
States

All States
but D.F.

Border
States

Rank

Y
Std. Error

4.068***
(0.470)

3.704***
(0.600)

3.415***
(0.710)

2.717***
(0.550)

1.636**
(0.796)

1.553*
(0.874)

1.535
(1.068)

0.101
(0.881)

2.001***
(0.563)

1.956***
(0.582)

1.408**
(0.656)

2.727***
(0.672)

INF
Std. Error
INF1
Std. Error

0.342
(0.210)

0.609
(0.406)

0.380
(2.051)

-0.332
(0.308)

Adj. R2

0.261

0.215

0.354

0.316

0.849

0.802

0.852

0.841

DW

1.596

1.591

2.624

1.682

1.632

1.632

2.731

2.107

Adj. R2
0.619
0.503
0.556
0.643
0.619
0.503
0.556
0.643
Com.
N
22
21
6
10
22
21
6
10
N*T
153
146
42
70
153
146
42
70
LM t-stat.
1.16
1.94
0.221
2.069**
0.33
0.33
-0.52
-2.26**
LM NR2
0.37
0.81
1.34
1.45
10.92**
9.92**
10.08**
7.08
Hausman
3.076
3.905
0.479
11.07***
0.958
1.444
0.000
2.584
Test
[0.215]
[0.142]
[0.787]
[0.004]
[0.619]
[0.486]
[1.000]
[0.274]
Notes: Data are of annual frequency from 1994 to 2001 per state; the 1994 observation is not available for
infrastructure, which makes the model run from 1995 to 2001. All estimates are performed by the Feasible
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) method for the Random Effects Model. No weighting is assumed on the
residual covariance matrix. The random effects model includes constant terms ( 0) that differ across states.
All these constant terms are omitted for space constraints. The “Adj. R2 Com” refers to the Adj. R2 of the
common intercept model suggested by Bekaert and Harvey (1997) as a test of how much of the variation in
FDI is explained by the specified variables. The LM t-stat. is the t-statistic associated with the lagged residual
within a standard Lagrange Multiplier test on the residuals of the panel data regression. The LM NR2 stat. is
the value derived from N and R2 computed in this auxiliary regression. This statistic follows a chi-squared
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of estimated parameters (p) in the auxiliary
2
2
regression:
(5) = 11.07 for fixed effects and
(6) = 12.59 for random effects. The LM NR2 stat. is
calculated under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation up to lag order 1, which is reasonable for annual
data. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 4
Average Standard Deviations of Residuals of FDI Models
Feasible GLS Estimations (Random Effects)
of residuals
(year average)

F(Y)

F(AGG) F(Y,INF) F(Y,INF,AGG)

F(Y,INF,AGG, GOV)

Aguascalientes
0.418
0.396
0.399
0.414
0.546
Baja Calif.
0.192
0.209
0.210
0.213
0.284
Baja Calif. Sur
0.431
0.367
0.308
0.317
0.529
Coahuila
0.235
0.2215
0.2207
0.2212
0.287
Chihuahua
0.190
0.199
0.169
0.131
0.282
DF
0.488
0.371
0.379
0.365
0.530
Durango
0.838
0.849
1.070
1.046
1.078
Guanajuato
1.389
1.180
1.172
1.159
1.422
Guerrero
1.090
1.101
1.076
1.084
1.115
Jalisco
0.571
0.474
0.479
0.519
0.751
México
0.534
0.511
0.542
0.539
0.544
Morelos
0.750
0.715
0.804
0.823
0.853
Nuevo León
0.590
0.571
0.572
0.570
0.711
Puebla
1.128
1.050
1.043
1.000
1.276
Queretaro
0.189
0.181
0.172
0.164
0.436
San Luis Potosi
1.593
1.456
1.463
1.440
1.636
Sinaloa
0.752
0.758
0.800
0.781
0.803
Sonora
0.290
0.286
0.273
0.279
0.400
Tamaulipas
0.219
0.162
0.287
0.294
0.344
Tlaxcala
0.842
0.793
0.832
0.828
0.844
Yucatán
0.607
0.582
0.573
0.562
0.671
Zacatecas
0.317
0.332
0.657
0.644
0.673
Sum of Highest
Residuals
Total of States
All States
1
13
0
3
5
22
All but DF
2
12
1
3
3
21
Border
0
5
1
0
0
6
Rank
0
8
0
1
1
10
Sum of Lowest
Residuals
Total of States
All States
4
4
3
3
8
22
All but DF
4
3
4
3
7
21
Border
0
1
2
1
2
6
Rank
2
2
1
2
3
10
Notes: The table reports the (average over time) standard deviation of residuals generated by the FGLS
REM for all states. We calculate the standard deviation of time series residuals for each state to identify
the amounts of FDI that can be better explained by the REM. The time series standard deviation of
residuals, averaged over time, is shown in the cells. The bold-faced cells represent the highest (or worst)
residuals across each cross-section unit. The sum of these across states is reported in the line “Sum of
Highest Residuals across All States” (22 states). The same procedure is reproduced for the three other
panels: “All but DF” (21 states), “Border” (6 states), and “Rank” (top 10 states by average of FDI
received over the time period).
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Table 5
Panel GMM Estimates of FDI Determinants
FDI = F (X) and (FDI) = G ( X)
All States, 1995 – 2001
Levels

Levels

Levels

Levels

INF
Std. Error

3.201*
(1.833)

2.887***
(0.401)

3.354*
(1.824)

2.717***
(0.683)

AGG
Std. Error

1.859
(3.394)

0.721
(0.475)

2.078
(2.308)

0.769
(0.524)

0.717
(1.066)

-0.192
(0.505)

GOV
Std. Error

FirstDiff.
Model

FirstDiff.
Model

FirstDiff.
Model

FirstDiff.
Model

12.273**
(4.964)

(INF)
Std. Error

-21.841*
(12.628)

(Y)
Std. Error

-8.119
(6.182)

(AGG)
Std. Error

-9.916
(22.821)

(GOV)
Std. Error
Instr.
List

C
RW(-1)
LU(-1)

C
AGG(-1)
INF(-1)

C
RW(-1)
LU(-1)

C
INF(-1)
AGG(-1)

C
RW(-1)
RW(-2)

C
RW(-1)
RW(-2)

C
RW(-1)
RW(-2)

C
RW(-1)
RW(-2)

Adj. R2

0.305

0.293

0.182

0.274

-0.095

-0.462

-0.074

-18.428

DW

1.427

2.013

0.822

2.047

2.954

2.351

2.820

1.911

J-stat.

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.186

0.042

2.022

0.039

Notes: A constant term is included in all estimations and all series are in logarithms. Data are of annual
frequency from 1994 to 2001 per state; the 1994 observation is not available for infrastructure, which makes
the model run from 1995 to 2001. All estimates are performed by Efficient GMM dynamic panel methods,
with random specification effects, cross-section weights and White (diagonal) for the covariance method. The
J-statistic tests the overidentified restrictions E [Zi’ i] = 0 where Z is the vector of instrumental variables
2
and is the error term. It follows a (q) distribution where q is the number of overidentified restrictions. At
2
the 5% level, for example,
(1) = 3.841. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10%,
5% and 1%, respectively.
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